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Collegiate Athletic Participation:
A Property or Liberty Interest?
Lucrative salaries for professional athletes today are commonplace.,
In 1982, for instance, the minimum salary in the National Football
League was $32,000 per year,2 and the highest paid player earned
approximately $667,000. 3 In baseball, the minimum salary was even
higher, at $33,500 per year,4 with the highest salary estimated at $1.652
million. 5 The average salary in the National Basketball Association
was $240,000,6 and the highest paid player earned $1.6 million per
season.7 To illustrate just how lucrative salaries for professional athletes
have become, no athlete in the National Hockey League ranked among
the 100 highest paid athletes in sports,' even though the top wage
in the league was $450,000 per season.9
Since lucrative professional contracts may be within grasp, college
athletes increasingly have harbored aspirations of playing professional
sports. For many college athletes, however, the prospect of a profes-
sional career is merely speculation. Only a small percentage of col-
lege athletes is talented enough to be drafted by a professional team.'"
An even smaller number of athletes who are drafted actually will earn
a spot on a major league roster."1
1. See The Sport 100, SPORT MAGAzINE, March, 1983, at 23. Salaries in professional
baseball have increased recently because of the free agent draft. For example, the San Fran-
cisco Giants recently signed free agent Manny Trillo, a second baseman, to a three-year con-
tract at $800,000 per year. Sacramento Bee, Dec. 22, 1983, at Cl, col. 2. Trillo earned $375,000
the previous season. Sacramento Bee, Dec. 14, 1983, at C6, col. 2. Salaries for professional
football players have increased recently because of the advent of the United States Football
League (USFL), a new league that is attempting to lure players away from the established
National Football League (NFL) to attract fans and to gain credibility. For example, the Mem-
phis Showboats, a USFL franchise, offered quarterback Ken Stabler $1 million to leave the
New Orleans Saints of the NFL. Sacramento Bee, Dec. 19, 1983, at D6, col. 1. The offer
to Stabler is part of a raid on NFL quarterbacks that is expected to force the salary structure
of both leagues to rise appreciably. Sacramento Bee, Dec. 23, 1983, at El, col. I, continued
on E6, col. 1.
2. The Sport 100, SPoRT MAGAzINE, March, 1983, at 28.
3. Id. at 25.
4. Id. at 28.
5. Id. at 24.
6. Id. at 28.
7. Id. at 24.
8. Id. at 23.
9. Id. at 25.
10. See Note, The NCAA, Amateurism and the Student-Athlete's Constitutional Rights
Upon Ineligibility, 15 NENv ENG. L. REv. 597, 624 n.171 (1980).
11. Id.
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College athletes also face many obstacles on the path to profes-
sional sports, not all of them athletic. For example, college athletes
must maintain minimum academic standards.' 2 College athletes also
must follow National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) eligibility
rules, like those prohibiting an athlete from accepting money as an
incentive to play for a school. 3 Since all college athletes are required
to be amateurs, they must comply with the eligibility rules.' 4 The
NCAA defines an amateur athlete as one who participates in a "par-
ticular sport for the educational, physical, mental and social benefits
derived therefrom and to whom participation in that sport is an
avocation."' 5 One of the fundamental policies of the NCAA, therefore,
is to maintain a clear demarcation between college athletics and pro-
fessional sports.16
Violations of eligibility rules frequently result in NCAA ordered
sanctions. Penalized athletes may be suspended from participation. 7
If this happens, the athletes lose the opportunity to refine their skills
and are deprived of the opportunity to demonstrate their talents to
professional scouts.'
Generally, athletes fear sanctions will decrease their chances of realiz-
ing professional careers. 9 Since the NCAA often imposes penalties
without allowing the disciplined individuals to appear and defend
themselves, 20 athletes increasingly have sought judicial relief. Athletes
have claimed that their property and liberty rights in participating
in college athletics have been denied by the NCAA without procedural
due process of law. 2' Some federal courts have allowed recovery,
22
but others have denied relief.23 Should recovery become the prevail-
ing view, college athletics will move increasingly away from academia
12. NCAA CONST. art. 3, §3, reprinted in 1983-84 MANUAL OF THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE




16. Id. art. 2, §2(a).
17. See id. art. 4, §2(a), 0.1. 11.
18. See Comment, Judicial Review of NCAA Decisions: Does the College Athlete Have
a Property Interest in Interscholastic Athletics?, 10 STETSON L. REv. 483, 486 (1980).
19. See infra notes 85-205 and accompanying text.
20. Congress has held hearings to investigate whether the NCAA should or does provide
adequate due process to schools and student athletes. In January 1979, the House Subcommit-
tee on Oversight and Investigation issued a 60 page report on the NCAA. The subcommittee
suggested 18 reform measures, all of which were initially rejected by the NCAA. Democratic
committee members favored reform, but Republican members stressed nonintervention in the
affairs of a private organization. Comment, supra note 18, at 485 n.13.
21. See infra notes 85-245 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 126-205 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 85-125 and accompanying text.
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and toward professional sports because the college athletic forum will
become a minor league for professional sports.
24
This comment will demonstrate that college athletes have no prop-
erty or liberty interest in athletic participation. 25 The elements con-
stituting a property right will be examined briefly prior to an analysis
of whether the claims of college athletes rise to constitutional
dimensions.26 A discussion of precedents involving high school and
college athletes will reveal that athletic participation does not fall within
the scope of the protected property right. 27 Finally, the claims of col-
lege athletes to a liberty interest in athletic participation will be
explored." Before courts will decide the constitutional issues, however,
they first must be satisfied that NCAA action is state action.29
NCAA DISCIPLINARY MEASURES AS STATE ACTION
The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution pro-
hibits a state from depriving an individual of life, liberty, or prop-
erty without due process of law.30 The state action requirement means
that constitutional protections do not apply to purely private conduct.
3
1
College athletes, therefore, first must prove that action by the NCAA
constitutes state action. before they can allege that NCAA disciplinary
measures deprived them of property or liberty without due process.
The NCAA is a private, unincorporated association comprising ap-
proximately 840 member institutions.32 The private character of the
NCAA, however, does not preclude a finding of state action. Private
conduct can become so intermingled with governmental activities as
to take on a governmental character, thereby invoking constitutional
guarantees. 3
24. Newsletter from Sports Lawyers Association 3 (spring-summer 1982) (copy on file at
the Pacific Law Journal).
25. This comment addresses the entitlement of a college athlete to participate after he
has violated an eligibility rule.
26. See infra notes 46-75 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 76-233 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 234-46 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 30-45 and accompanying text.
30. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, §1.
31. J. NovAK, R. ROTUNDA AND J. YoUN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 497 (2d ed. 1983).
32. See Comment, supra note 18, at 484-85.
33. Howard University v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 510 F.2d 213, 217 (D.C.
Cir. 1975). The entanglement theory advanced in Howard is more appropriate than a public
function analysis. The public function theory is that private parties are subject to constitutional
restrictions if they perform functions traditionally reserved to the state. A recent United States
Supreme Court opinion, however, has interpreted this doctrine as applying only when the private
party assumed all the functions of the government entity. See Note, supra note 10, at 602.
For NCAA measures to constitute state action under a public function analysis, the NCAA
1205
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In Howard University v. National Collegiate Athletic Association,34
the plaintiffs, a private university and one of its student athletes, sought
injunctive and declaratory relief, claiming their constitutional rights
were abridged by the NCAA.3s The NCAA had imposed sanctions
upon the university for allowing ineligible athletes to compete on the
soccer team. 36 The district court found that state action was present,317
and the NCAA disputed that finding.38
In affirming the district court, the District of Columbia Circuit Court
of Appeals noted that the NCAA is saturated with both state and
federal influences. 9 Approximately half of the member institutions
of the NCAA receive state or federal funds."0 Financial contribution
to the NCAA is based upon the size of the institution." Public univer-
sities generally have a larger student population than private univer-
sities, which results in public institutions providing the majority of
funds to the NCAA. 2 The majority of individuals who are members
of the NCAA governing council, as well as some officers of the coun-
cil, also work for public institutions. 3 Noting that the degree of public
participation and entanglement between the NCAA and its members
is so substantial and pervasive, the court found the requisite state
action.""
The rationale of Howard University generally has been accepted.4"
Upon the finding of state action, a court then must determine whether
a constitutionally protected interest exists.
would have to be involved in all activities that a state would perform in regard to education.
Id. at 603. However, the NCAA only regulates athletics. Id.
34. 510 F.2d 213 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 214. Three students had exhausted their eligibility for varsity competition, and
one student had been admitted to the university with inadequate academic credentials. Id. at
215-16.
37. Id. at 216-17.
38. Id. at 217.





44. Id. at 220.
45. See, e.g., Regents of the University of Minnesota v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n,
560 F.2d 352, 364 (8th Cir. 1977); Parish v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 506 F.2d 1028,
1031-33 (5th Cir. 1975); Colorado Seminary v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 417 F. Supp.
885, 894 n.4 (D. Colo. 1976); Jones v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 392 F. Supp. 295,
298 (D. Mass. 1975); Buckton v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 366 F. Supp. 1152, 1156-57
(D. Mass. 1973). But see McDonald v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 370 F. Supp. 625,
631 (C.D. Cal. 1974). In McDonald, the court held that the NCAA is not a sovereign entity
since the student athlete has no interest in the membership of his university in the NCAA.
The court also said that voluntary concurrence of a state in a decision of a private association
1206
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THE CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED PROPERTY INTEREST
Prior to the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Board
of Regents v. Roth,"6 an interest was considered property under the
United States Constitution if it was a right, not a privilege." If a
governmental entity created a benefit without having a duty to do
so, the benefit conferred was deemed to be a privilege that could
be withdrawn without due process." Since the Roth decision, however,
the definition of property has involved a concept of entitlement."9
Courts will recognize a property interest in a benefit if the individual
is found to be entitled to the benefit."
In Goss v. Lopez,5' the United States Supreme Court applied the
Roth rationale to suspensions of students from public high schools.The
entitlement concept was refined further in Bishop v. Wood,"2 a case
involving a claim for continued employment. To understand how the
entitlement concept of property rights is applied, the factual setting
of Roth must be examined.
A. Board of Regents v. Roth
The United States Supreme Court, in Board of Regents v. Roth,53
rejected the rigid distinction between rights and privileges that once
was determinative of the applicability of procedural due process. In
Roth, the plaintiff was hired as an assistant professor at Wisconsin
State University at Oshkosh."4 Plaintiff's employment contract was
for a fixed term of one academic year." Plaintiff was released without
explanation after the first year.5 6 Under Wisconsin law, Roth was not
entitled to tenure.57 Roth brought suit, claiming the university had
does not convert the act of the organization into state action. Id. The McDonald decision,
however, was overruled sub silentio by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. See Associated
Students of California State University-Sacramento v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 493
F.2d 1251, 1254 (1974). In Associated Students, the court held that NCAA disciplinary measures
were state action because the NCAA controls public schools by ordering them either to discipline
athletes who violate eligibility rules or to face stiff sanctions. The Ninth Circuit relied on precedent
in other circuits and did not discuss McDonald. Id.
46. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
47. J. NowAI, R. ROTUNDA AND J. YotmN, supra note 31, at 546.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 547.
50. Id.
51. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
52. 426 U.S. 341 (1976).
53. 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972).
54. Id. at 566.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 568.
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deprived him of a property right without procedural due process
because he did not receive a hearing prior to his release.58
The Court denied Roth's claim. The Court stated that property in-
terests are created and defined by existing principles that stem from
independent sources and which support genuine claims of entitlement
to benefits. 9 A property interest exists when a person has a legitimate
claim of entitlement to a benefit, not just a unilateral expectation
of that benefit.60 The nature of the interest, not its weight, therefore
determines the applicability of due process safeguards. 6'
The Court held that Roth's contract must be interpreted with
reference to state law.62 Since Wisconsin law afforded procedural due
process only to tenured teachers who were dismissed, Roth was not
deprived of a property right because he was not entitled to tenure
and thus had no legitimate claim of entitlement to a hearing.63 The
Roth entitlement concept, which requires a legitimate claim to a benefit
created by an independent source, was applied to suspensions of
students from public schools in Goss v. Lopez.64
B. Goss v. Lopez
In Goss, nine Ohio high school students had been suspended from
public schools for ten days because of disruptive and disobedient
conduct. 65 None of the students received a hearing to determine the
facts giving rise to the suspensions, but all students, after suspen-
sion, were permitted to attend a conference to discuss their future.66
The United States Supreme Court held that the suspended students
clearly had a legitimate claim of entitlement to public education that
could not be withdrawn absent due process.67 This claim was based
on an Ohio law that provided for free education to all children be-
tween the ages of six and twenty-one. 68 The nine students facing
suspension, therefore, were entitled to notice of the charges against
them and an opportunity to present evidence in their behalf.69 The
58. Id. at 569.
59. Id. at 577.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 571.
62. See id. at 578.
63. See id.
64. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
65. Id. at 569.
66. Id. at 570.
67. Id. at 573-74.
68. Id. at 567.
69. Id. at 581.
1208
1984 / Athletic Participation
scope of the property right advanced in Roth was defined more precise-
ly in Bishop v. Wood.70
C. Bishop v. Wood
In Bishop, the petitioner was a policeman for the city of Marion,
North Carolina, until he was dismissed without explanation or op-
portunity to contest his discharge. 71 Bishop claimed that as a "per-
manent employee," he had a property right in his continued employ-
ment and thus was entitled to a hearing." Applying the holding in
Roth, the Court held that the petitioner was entitled to continued
employment only if his contract or other independent source, like state
law, provided for that guarantee.7 3 The ordinance upon which Bishop
relied was construed as only granting employment at the will of the
city.74 Bishop's discharge, therefore, did not deprive him of a pro-
perty right protected by the fourteenth amendment because his "at-
will" work agreement with the city did not provide for continued
employment."
As discussed previously, state law and other independent sources
may create property rights. Under the fourteenth amendment, due
process is required before individuals can be deprived of property.
In Roth and Bishop, the laws relied upon did not create claims of
entitlement. In Goss, however, state law did create a property right.
The scope of the property right defined in Goss is unclear. The
Goss decision, for example, may protect students only when they are
denied all access to education." Under this view, a student is depriv-
ed of a property interest only when he is suspended from school.
77
Conversely, Goss may have recognized separate property rights in every
activity related to the educational process. 78 If this is the case, a stu-
dent is deprived of a property interest when he is suspended from
athletic participation or any other extracurricular activity, regardless
of whether he is prohibited from attending school.79 The following
section examines the impact of Goss on suspensions of athletes and
70. 426 U.S. 341 (1976); see also J. ,EIsTART AND C. LowE.,, THE LAW OF SPoRTs 95
(1979) (United States Supreme Court adopts restrictive view of "entitlement").
71. 426 U.S. at 342-43.
72. Id. at 344.
73. Id. at 345.
74. Id.
75. See id. at 347.
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concludes that athletics, whether high school or college, are not a
protected part of an education. A discussion of the pre-Goss arguments
advanced by courts that found athletic participation to be unworthy
of protection is presented first.
ATHLETIC PARTICIPATION AS INSUFFICIENT TO
MERIT SEPARATE PROTECTION
Prior to the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in Roth
and Goss, courts that confronted the issue of a property right in
athletic participation were guided by the right/privilege dichotomy.80
The pre-Goss decisions have remained important, however, because
courts have continued to rely on them even though the right/privilege
analysis is no longer a correct application of constitutional law."'
Courts that have found athletic participation to be unworthy of due
process protection in the post-Goss era have interpreted Goss as pro-
tecting only the total educational process, not each individual com-
ponent of education.8" These courts have found high school and col-
lege athletes to be similarly situated.83 Athletic participation also does
not receive protection under an analysis pursuant to Bishop because
Bishop's claim for continued employment is comparable to the stu-
dent athletes' argument for continued participation.
8 4
A. Pre-Goss
Prior to Goss, some jurisdictions determined that due process was
not applicable to suspended athletes because athletic participation was
not a vested right. In Sanders v. Louisiana High School Athletic
Association,85 a transfer student sued to enjoin application of a
residency requirement that rendered him ineligible for high school
athletic participation because he had not been enrolled at his new
school for one full year.8 6 Plaintiff, an outstanding football player,
argued that he was deprived of a "substantial pecuniary property right"
since he could not display his athletic talents to college coaches, thereby
impairing his chances of obtaining a college football scholarship.8 7
80. See infra notes 85-97 and accompanying text.
81. See supra notes 46-75 and accompanying text.
82. See infra notes 98-108 and accompanying text.
83. See infra notes 109-19 and accompanying text.
84. See infra notes 120-26 and accompanying text.
85. 242 So. 2d 19 (La. 1970).
86. Id. at 22-23.
87. Id. at 28.
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A Louisiana appellate court held that plaintiff had no vested prop-
erty right in participating in interscholastic high school athletics. 8
Other courts denied relief on the ground that athletic participation
was a mere privilege. In Marino v. Waters,89 plaintiff, an outstanding
football prospect, challenged a high school transfer rule that he claimed
deprived him of a property right without due process of law."' Plain-
tiff argued that since his participation in football would attract a col-
lege scholarship worth a substantial sum of money, the rule that
rendered him ineligible resulted in a deprivation of property. 91 The
court held, however, that participation in athletics is a mere privilege
and that the plaintiff's chances of obtaining a scholarship were too
speculative to warrant protection.2
The pre-Goss line of cases came to fruition with the decision of
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Mitchell v. Louisiana High
School Athletic Association.3 In Mitchell, the plaintiff voluntarily
chose to repeat the eighth grade even though he could have advanced
to high school because he had successfully completed his studies.94
When plaintiff advanced to high school, he was disqualified from
participation in interscholastic athletics during his senior year because
he had violated an eligibility rule. 95
Mitchell argued he was denied due process because the Louisiana
High School Athletic Association had failed to give reasonable notice
to grammer schools that anyone who voluntarily repeated a grade
would lose a year of eligibility.9 6 The Fifth Circuit held that the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment could not eradicate all
wrongs and that participation in interscholastic athletics is a privilege
that falls outside the protection of the amendment."
88. Id., see also Morrison v. Roberts, 82 P.2d 1023, 1025 (Okla. 1938) (17-year-old foot-
ball player had no vested right in eligibility for high school football); Kissick v. Garland In-
dependent School District, 330 S.W.2d 708, 712 (Tex. 1959) (16-year-old football player with
potential for college scholarship had a contingent or expectant right, not a vested one).
89. 220 So. 2d 802 (La. 1969).
90. Id. at 804.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 806; see also Scott v. Kilpatrick, 237 So. 2d 652, 655 (Ala. 1970) (participation
in high school athletics, like any extracurricular activity, is a privilege); Tennessee Secondary
School Athletic Ass'n v. Cox, 425 S.W. 2d 597, 602 (Tenn. 1968) (the "right" to participate
is a mere privilege).
93. 430 F.2d 1155 (1970).
94. Id. at 1156. This author speculates that the athletes may have decided to repeat eighth
grade because they would be physically stronger and more coordinated than their new classmates
and thus would have an advantage in athletic competition.
95. Id. Mitchell violated the "Eight Semester Rule," which provided for forfeiture of a
year of eligibility in high school if a student repeated any grade that he had passed. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1157-58. The holding in Mitchell also was followed in three other pre-Goss cases.
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Courts, therefore, denied protection to athletics prior to Goss because
they viewed participation as a contingent interest or as a mere privilege.
This view culminated with the Mitchell decision, which held that
athletic participation was not constitutionally protected. The value of
Mitchell as precedent, however, is questionable. The Fifth Circuit in
Mitchell did not address the scope of the protection afforded to the
educational process, an issue left unresolved in Goss. The Mitchell
holding, in addition, is a valid precedent for the rejection of college
athletes' due process claims only if high school and college athletes
are similarly situated. When confronted with these issues in the post-
Goss era, several courts have concluded that athletic participation still
does not deserve constitutional protection.
B. Post-Goss
Several courts have considered and rejected the notion that Goss
requires high school or college athletes to be afforded notice and op-
portunity to be heard before being disciplined. In Albach v. Odle,98
plaintiff asked the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals to enjoin applica-
tion of a transfer rule that bars from interscholastic competition for
one year any student who transfers from his home district to a high
school boarding house, or vice versa."9 The plaintiff argued that Goss
protected the component parts of the educational process and therefore
his participation in athletics was a property right that could not be
withdrawn without due process of law.'00
The Tenth Circuit rejected the argument. Citing Goss, the Albach
court noted that the educational process is a broad and comprehen-
sive concept that includes numerous separate parts like athletic par-
ticipation, which combine to provide a healthy intellectual and moral
atmosphere.10' The Tenth Circuit did not interpret Goss as creating
a property interest requiring constitutional protection of each com-
ponent part.102
The Albach rational was refined further in Dallam v. Cumberland
Valley School District,"3 another case in which a high school student
See Bucha v. Illinois High School Athletic Ass'n, 351 F. Supp. 69, 73 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Taylor
v. Alabama High School Athletic Ass'n, 336 F. Supp. 54, 57 (M.D. Ala. 1972); State Bd.
of Ed. v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 273 So. 2d 912, 916 (La. 1973).
98. 531 F.2d 983 (10th Cir. 1976).
99. Id. at 984.
100. Id. at 985.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. 391 F. Supp. 358 (M.D. Penn. 1975).
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challenged a transfer rule.' 4 In Dallam, the plaintiff argued that he
had a property interest in interscholastic participation because Goss
protected every aspect of the educational process.' 5 The Dallam court,
however, distinguished Goss by stating that Goss was concerned with
total exclusion from the educational process and that students were
deprived of a property interest only when they were suspended from
all school activities. 0 6 Specifically, the district court said "[t]he myriad
activities which combine to form that educational process cannot be
dissected to create hundreds of separate property rights, each cognizable
under the Constitution."'0 7 To hold otherwise, the court said, would
"too greatly strain the concept of property."'0 8
Courts that have denied relief to college athletes who claimed they
were deprived of property without due process have relied on pre-
Goss decisions, particularly Mitchell.0 9 As discussed previously, those
particular pre-Goss decisions involved high school athletes. Courts ap-
parently have discerned no difference between the interests of high
school and college athletes.
Colorado Seminary v. National Collegiate Athletic Association"'
is one decision in which the court relied on precedents involving high
school athletes. In Colorado Seminary, the University of Denver and
its student athletes brought suit to enjoin the NCAA from suspend-
ing several hockey players who had accepted money as an incentive
to play for the school in violation of NCAA eligibility rules."' The
plaintiffs argued that they had been deprived of the property right
to compete in intercollegiate athletics" 2 because the college athletic
forum provides a vital training ground for professional careers." 3 The
district court rejected this contention. The court considered the in-
terest in future professional careers to be speculative and perceived
104. Id. at 359.
105. See id. at 361.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 362; see also Kulovitz v. Illinois High School Athletic Ass'n, 462 F. Supp. 875,
878 (N.D. I11. 1978) (citing Albach); Colorado Seminary v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n,
417 F. Supp. 885 (D. Colo. 1976), aff'd, 570 F.2d 320, 321 (1978) (per curiam) (citing Albach).
The Colorado Seminary decision is significant since the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals applied
the Albach rationale to a case involving college athletes. 570 F.2d at 321.
109. This author speculates that courts have continued to rely on Mitchell because that
case specifically held that athletes have no property right in participation. At least one court,
however, has indicated that Goss applies to college athletes. See supra note 108 and accom-
panying text.
110. 417 F. Supp. 885 (D. Colo. 1976), aff'd, 570 F.2d 320 (10th Cir. 1978) (per curiam).
111. 417 F. Supp. at 891.
112. See id. at 893-94.
113. Id. at 895.
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no constitutional distinction between the loss of a forum for attrac-
ting a college scholarship and the similar loss of a forum for attrac-
ting a professional contract.' 4 The athletes, therefore, had no prop-
erty interest in participation.
Another case in which college athletes claimed they were deprived
of a property interest without due process was Parish v. National
Collegiate Athletic Association.' In Parish, the NCAA had placed
Centenary College on indefinite probation for violating an eligibility
rule by providing scholarships to five basketball players whose grades
in high school and scores on college entrance examinations indicated
that they would not succeed academically in college." 6 The five players
sought to enjoin the NCAA from applying the rule." 7
At oral argument, however, the players abandoned their claim that
the NCAA had deprived them of a property right without due pro-
cess, in this instance, tournament experience and television exposure." 8
The Fifth Circuit noted that the players "wisely abandoned" their
due process claim, citing Mitchell and hypothesizing that any prop-
erty interest was too speculative under Roth,"9 which required a
legitimate claim of entitlement to a benefit, not just a unilateral ex-
pectation of benefit.
The Fifth Circuit, therefore, implicitly reaffirmed Mitchell, which
held that participation in interscholastic athletics is not a constitu-
tionally protected right, by indicating that the Mitchell holding ap-
plies to college athletes. As discussed above, the Fifth Circuit also
suggested that the student athletes' claims of entitlement to participa-
tion could not withstand analysis under Roth. An analogy to Bishop,
which applied Roth, is also of little assistance to advocates of a prop-
erty right in athletic participation. Bishop's claim for continued employ-
ment, which was rejected by the Untied States Supreme Court, is
114. Id.
115. 506 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 1975).
116. Id. at 1030. The school had violated the 1.600 rule, which prohibited an NCAA member
from awarding a scholarship to or allowing athletic participation by an entering freshman who
did not have a predicted minimum grade point average of 1.600, based on a maximum of
4.0, as determined by prediction tables of the NCAA. California State University, Hayward
v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 47 Cal. App. 3d 533, 538, 121 Cal. Rptr. 85, 87-88
(1975). The NCAA repealed the 1.600 rule in 1973, replacing it with the 2.00 rule, which only
requires an entering freshman to have earned an overall 2.00 grade point average in high school.
506 F.2d at 1030 n.l.
117. 506 "F.2d at 1031.
118. Id. at 1034 n.17.
119. Id. Mitchell also has remained good precedent for high school cases in the post-Goss
era, as at least two courts have cited the holding with approval. See Hamilton v. Tennessee
Secondary School Athletic Ass'n, 552 F.2d 681, 682 (1976); Walsh v. Louisiana High School
Athletic Ass'n, 428 F. Supp. 1261, 1265 (1977).
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similar to the student athletes' claim for continued athletic
participation.
C. Bishop Analysis
In Bishop, the Untied States Supreme Court looked to an indepen-
dent source, which in that situation was a city ordinance, and deter-
mined that Bishop's employment was terminable by the city at any
time for any valid reason. ' According to the Court, Bishop had only
a unilateral expectation of, and not a legitimate claim of entitlement
to, continued employment.' Bishop, therefore, was not deprived of
a property right. 2
The situation in Bishop is analogous to the student athlete's claim
of entitlement. By awarding a scholarship to the athlete, the school
becomes the independent source that creates the entitlement to inter-
collegiate competition.'23 The scope of the entitlement, therefore, is
defined by the eligibility rules of the school."' A school that is a
member of the NCAA agrees to administer athletic programs in ac-
cordance with the NCAA constitution, bylaws, and legislation.'
2 5
NCAA member institutions are obligated to withhold student athletes
120. See supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Some commentators have suggested the athletic scholarship is a contract between the
student-athlete and the school that creates a property right in participation. Comment, A Student-
Athlete's Interest in Eligibility: Its Context and Constitutional Dimensions, 10 CONN. L. R-v.
318, 345-48 (1978). The law on whether an athletic scholarship is a contract, however, is far
from settled. Those courts that have confronted the issue, usually in the context of workers'
compensation, are not in agreement. Compare Van Horn v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 219
Cal. App. 2d 457, 466, 33 Cal. Rptr. 169, 174 (1963) and University of Denver v. Nemeth,
257 P.2d 423, 428 (Colo. 1953) (scholarship a contract) with State Compensation Ins. Fund
v. Industrial Comm'n, 314 P.2d 288, 289 (Colo. 1957) and Rensing v. Indiana State University
Bd. of Trustees, 444 N.E. 2d 1170, 1175 (Ind. 1983) (scholarship not a contract). These cases
apparently turn on how the scholarship is structured. Generally, a student athlete will not be
considered an employee because he receives financial aid. WESART AND LOWEL, supra note
70, at 12. When, however, the scholarship is structured so that performance of athletic services
is the quid pro quo for the aid, then the athlete may be an employee under contract to the
school. Id. at 12-13. See also Taylor v. Wake Forest University, 191 S.E. 2d 379 (N.C. 1972)
(contractual relationship existed because aid would cease upon athlete's failure to participate
in athletics). The NCAA mandates, however, that athletic participation not be the major criterion
used by member schools in deciding whether to award financial aid. NCAA CONST. art. 3,
§4(a)(3), reprinted in NCAA MA-uA, supra note 12, at 18. The conclusion that a college
athlete is under contract is troublesome, moreover, since the athlete who accepts a scholarship
may be found to have violated amateur rules. WmSTART AN LOWELL, supra note 70, at 11.
A finding of a contractual relationship also may render the athlete ineligible for international
competition. Id. at 15.
124. The student athlete's scholarship may incorporate the NCAA Constitution and bylaws.
See Fluitt v. University of Nebraska, 489 F. Supp. 1194, 1198 (D. Neb. 1980); Rensing v.
Indiana State University Bd. of Trustees, 444 N.E. 2d 1170, 1173 (Ind. 1983).
125. NCAA CoNsT. art. 4, §2(a), reprinted in NCAA MAuA, supra note 12, at 27.
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from all intercollegiate competition if the athletes are ineligible under
NCAA rules.' Student athletes suspended for rule violations,
therefore, are not deprived of a property right protected by the four-
teenth amendment because their scholarship agreements do not pro-
vide for continued participation in athletics after they violate eligibility
rules. In this type of a situation, the athletes' expectation of con-
tinued participation is unilateral.
Despite Goss, which extended constitutional protection to the educa-
tional process, many courts have refused to recognize college athletes'
due process claims. These courts have interpreted Goss as protecting
the whole educational experience and not each individual component
of the educational process. Courts have continued to rely on precedents
in which high school athletes were denied relief, indicating that high
school and college sports are "two rungs" of the same "athletic
ladder." An analogy to Bishop, a case in which the Roth entitlement
theory was applied, also demonstrates that college athletes have no
property right in athletic competition because they have a unilateral
expectation of continued participation after they violate eligibility rules.
This reasoning generally is not accepted by advocates who believe that
athletic participation merits constitutional protection. The arguments
of those advocates are examined in the next section.
ATHLETIC PARTICIPATION AS WORTHY OF SEPARATE PROTECTION
Persons who contend that athletic participation is a property right
have advanced three arguments in support of their position, all of
which will be refuted in this section. Advocates have argued that
athletic participation is an integral aspect of education deserving of
protection.' 27 Further, they urge that the potential economic benefit
of a professional sports contract justifies relief'28 and that athletes,
like students in professional programs, deserve procedural due pro-
cess prior to suspensions.' 29 Two California courts have found athletics
to be a substantial interest worthy of protection.'30 In one case,
however, the court based its holding on a statutory interpretation and,
in the other case, the court considered only the interests of the univer-
sity, not the interests of the student athletes.' 3 ' California decisions,
therefore, do not support college athletes' contentions that the United
126. Id. §2(a), 0.1. 11.
127. See infra notes 133-68 and accompanying text.
128. See infra notes 169-205 and accompanying text.
129. See infra notes 206-13 and accompanying text.
130. See infra notes 214-29 and accompanying text.
131. Id.
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States Constitution protects athletic participation. '32 This section begins
with an examination of the decisions that have found athletics to be
related integrally to education.
A. Athletics as an Integral Aspect of Education
Many courts have held that athletics, as an integral component of
education, are protected by the Constitution. These cases, however,
have involved clearly defined constitutional issues in the context of
athletic regulation. An analysis of these cases will show that they can-
not stand for the proposition that athletic participation alone is suf-
ficient to invoke constitutional guarantees.' 33
1. Alienage discrimination
In Buckton v. National Collegiate Athletic Association,' two Boston
University hockey players, both Canadian citizens, were found ineligible
by the NCAA because they had accepted money for room, board,
and books while participating in a Canadian amateur hockey league.' 35
The district court noted that the plaintiffs were skilled hockey players
whose potential for careers in teaching, coaching, and professional
hockey would be enhanced by a college hockey career. '136
The court, however, did not enjoin the NCAA from applying the
eligibility rule because of the athletes' interest in participation. Rather,
the NCAA rules that prohibited play in Canadian amateur hockey
leagues were held to impose disparate eligibility standards on student
athletes who played hockey in the United States as compared to those
who played in Canada.'3 7 The rules, according to the court, violated
the fourteenth amendment because of arbitrary discrimination based
on alienage.'38 The Buckton case, therefore, does not establish a prop-
erty right in athletic participation because the court found the alienage
issue to be controlling.
2. Marital privacy
In Davis v. Meek,'39 the plaintiff, an eighteen-year-old varsity
132. Id.
133. Albach v. Odle, 531 F.2d 983, 984 (10th Cir. 1976).
134. 366 F. Supp. 1152 (D. Mass. 1973).
135. Id. at 1154.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1157.
138. Id. at 1159.
139. 344 F. Supp. 298 (N.D. Ohio 1972).
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baseball player, challenged a regulation that prohibited him from par-
ticipating in extracurricular activities because he was married.'4 0 The
court observed that the plaintiff had a substantial interest in playing
baseball because four major league scouts had talked to him and at
least four colleges indicated that they might grant him a scholarship.' 4'
The court also noted the economic potential of professional baseball,
142
but refused to enjoin the application of the rule because of the plain-
tiff's interest in participation. Rather, the challenged regulation was
found to invade marital privacy, which is protected by the United
States Constitution, and hence the regulation was unconstitutional.'43
The Davis case, therefore, did not establish the existence of a prop-
erty right in athletic participation because the court treated the in-
terference with the marital relationship as the controlling issue.
3. Racial discrimination
Racial discrimination was alleged in Kelley v. Metropolitan County
Board of Education of Nashville.'" In Kelley, an all-black high school
was suspended from interscholastic competition for one year for alleged
misconduct following a closely contested basketball game that the
school team lost. '4 The suspension was recommended by a commit-
tee of sixteen members, only five of whom were black. 46 The district
court expressly found that racial discrimination was absent, although
plaintiffs argued throughout trial and in their briefs that racism was
a controlling factor.'4 7 In fact, the court held that regardless of race,
the right to engage in athletics was of such significance and worth
as to require procedural due process for its withdrawal.
4 8
Advocates of property rights for athletes regard Kelley as uncer-
tain authority because the case involved overtones of racial
discrimination.'" The validity of the Kelley holding, moreover, was
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 301. The court said: "However much one may share Thomas Jefferson's scorn
for games that are played with a ball .... it is difficult to refute the argument that a secon-
dary school system that deprives a student of the opportunity to develop his full potential
for entering the field of professional baseball is not functioning as it should." Id.
143. Id. at 302; see also Moran v. School Dist. #7, Yellowstone County, 350 F. Supp.
1180, 1184 (D. Mont. 1972) (eligibility rule held invalid because it discriminates against married
persons).
144. 293 F. Supp. 485 (M.D. Tenn. 1968).
145. Id. at 488.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 498.
148. Id. at 492.
149. Comment, supra note 18, at 491.
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questioned in Taylor v. Alabama High School Athletic Association.'5 °
In Taylor, a high school basketball team was suspended from par-
ticipation in tournament play for one year because of misconduct by
spectators during a championship game.' 5' Prior to the suspension,
no specific charges of misconduct were made against the school, and
no notice of specific charges was given.'52 The plaintiffs argued that
they were deprived of property without due process because the Kelley
decision established a property right in athletic participation.' 5 The
district court, however, said that Kelley did not analyze thoroughly
whether athletic participation was a federally protected property right,
and denied relief.' 5 The validity of the Kelley holding, therefore, is
questionable because the holding was challenged and rejected by the
Taylor court, which was confronted with a similar situation.
4. Religious discrimination
A first amendment issue was raised in Chabert v. Louisiana High
School Athletic Association.' In Chabert, plaintiff, a high school
football player, sought to enjoin the application of a rule prohibiting
transfer.15 6 Plaintiff had lost one year of eligibility due to the rule
because he enrolled in a parochial school located within a public school
district other than the district in which he resided.' 57 The Catholic
school in which plaintiff enrolled was the only one in the area.' 8
Had he lived in the district in which the school was situated, he would
not have lost a year of eligibility.' 59
The court noted that extracurricular activities were an integral part
of education.'60 The issue in the case, however, was not whether plain-
tiff had the absolute right to participate in athletics, but whether he
could be denied the benefits that accrue to other Catholic children
similarly situated.' 6 ' Applying a rational basis test, the Supreme Court
of Louisiana held that the transfer rule was reasonably related to the
150. 336 F. Supp. 54 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
151. Id. at 55.
152. Id. at 55-56.
153. Id. at 56.
154. Id. at 57.
155. 323 So. 2d 774 (La. 1975).
156. Id. at 775.
157. Id. at 776.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 778.
161. Id. at 777.
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purpose of discouraging unethical recruiting, and the rule was upheld. 2
Because religious discrimination was the dispositive issue in this case,
Chabert is not authority for a property right in athletic participation.
5. Gender discrimination
In Brenden v. Independent School District,'6 3 female high school
students sought an injunction barring enforcement of a rule prohibiting
females from participating in interscholastic activities with males. 6 4
The plaintiffs wanted to participate in noncontact interscholastic sports
in which the school did not provide separate teams for females.
6
1
The court observed that the plaintiffs' interest in participating in in-
terscholastic sports was substantial and cognizable, 166 and that athletics
were an integral part of the total educational process. 67 The plain-
tiffs were granted relief, however, on the basis that the rule
discriminated against females on account of their sex, thereby depriving
them of equal protection of the law.' 68 Brenden, therefore, is not
authority for a property right in athletic participation because gender
discrimination was the reason for which the court enjoined applica-
tion of the eligibility rule.
These cases have found athletics to be a significant interest that,
pursuant to Goss, is part of the total educational process. These cases,
however, also have contained clearly defined constitutional issues. The
traditional constitutional questions were decisive for those courts grant-
ing relief. In contrast, other courts extending due process protection
to college athletes have relied mainly on the potential economic benefit
of athletic participation. This rationale, however, ignores the stan-
dards advanced in Roth.
B. Potential Economic Benefit
When college athletes have sued to enjoin disciplinary measures,
courts that have granted relief focused on the potential economic in-
terest at stake, not on the protection given to the educational pro-
162. Id. at 779-80. The court applied a rational basis test because the transfer rule applied
to public and private schools and hence did not impair the exercise of a fundamental right
or discriminate against a suspect class. Id.
163. 477 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1973).
164. Id. at 1294.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1299.
167. Id. at 1298.
168. Id. at 1302; see also Reed v. Nebraska School Activities Ass'n, 341 F. Supp. 258,
261 (D. Neb. 1972); Haas v. South Bend Community School Corp., 289 N.E.2d 495, 499 (Ind.
1972) (relief granted because of gender discrimination).
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cess. By focusing on economic benefit, however, these courts have
disregarded the language in Roth that the nature of the interest, not
its weight, determines whether due process rights are invoked.'69 An
analysis of these cases will show that they are not authority for a
property right in athletic participation.
The case most frequently cited for recognizing the college athlete's
property right in participation is Behagen v. Intercollegiate Conference
of Faculty Representatives.'70 In Behagen, two members of the Univer-
sity of Minnesota varsity basketball team were suspended from com-
petition for one season because of their participation in a fight that
occurred during a game with Ohio State University.' 7 ' The athletes,
however, did not argue that they were deprived of a property right
without due process. They claimed, instead, that the Big Ten Con-
ference had established a disciplinary procedure that provided for pro-
per notice and opportunity to be heard, 72 and that due process was
violated when the Big Ten disregarded the rules.' 73
The Behagen court acknowledged that "big time" college athletics
may lead to multimillion dollar professional contracts.' 74 The court
took judicial notice that to many athletes the chance to display their
skills is worth more in economic terms than a college education.'
75
The actual holding of the court, however, was that the Big Ten had
denied the athletes due process of law because the athletic conference
failed to adhere to the established procedure for disciplinary actions.'
7
1
Behagen, therefore, did not establish that athletes have a property
right in participation.
The dictum in Behagen, that college athletics are a forum in which
participants may attract lucrative professional contracts, was thought
sufficient by the district court to establish a property right in par-
ticipation in Regents of the University of Minnesota v. National Col-
legiate Athletic Association.1 77 In that case, the NCAA ordered the
University of Minnesota to suspend three basketball players for eligibil-
169. See supra notes 53-63 and accompanying text.
170. 346 F. Supp. 602 (D. Minn. 1972).
171. Id. at 603.
172. Id. at 606.
173. Id. at 603.
174. Id. at 604.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 606. Since the Big Ten rules entitled schools and student athletes to appear
and defend themselves, the plaintiff under a Roth analysis probably had a property right in
this disciplinary procedure. The Big Ten in no way created an entitlement to participation,
however. The scope of that entitlement is defined by the agreement between the student athlete
and his school. See supra notes 120-26 and accompanying text.
177. 422 F. Supp. 1158 (D. Minn. 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 560 F.2d 352 (8th Cir. 1977).
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ity violations. 1" After conducting hearings consistent with procedural
due process, the university decided that no violations had occurred,
and the school refused to comply with the demands of the NCAA. 179
The NCAA responded by placing all of the athletic teams at the univer-
sity on indefinite probation.'
Although contractually bound to the NCAA,'8 ' the university con-
tended that a superior constitutional duty was owed to the student
athletes because athletic participation falls within the due process pro-
tection of the fourteenth amendment.' The district court agreed, citing
the dictum in Behagen to support the proposition that athletic par-
ticipation is a substantial property interest. 3 The court explained that
the opportunity to play basketball was protected because the activity
may lead to a very profitable professional career in exceptional
circumstances." 4 The court also noted that athletics are an important
part of the student athletes' educational experience. '5
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit accepted for the sake of argument
that the suspended athletes had a property right in participation,
8 6
but reversed the decision of the district court on other grounds. After
reviewing the facts, the Eighth Circuit decided that due process was
satisfied because the university had uncovered eligibility violations after
conducting a hearing at which the three athletes were given notice
of the charges against them and were allowed an opportunity to de-
fend themselves.8 7 Based on the findings of the hearing, the univer-
sity could have declared the athletes ineligible without violating the
fourteenth amendment even if the athletes had a property right in
participation.' Since the Eighth Circuit reversed the decision without
deciding the property right issue, the holding of the district court that
athletic participation is a protected property interest is of uncertain
authority as precedent.
The most recent decision that restored an athlete's eligibility because
178. 422 F. Supp. at 1159.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. See supra notes 30-45 and accompanying text.
182. 422 F. Supp. at 1160-61.
183. Id. at 1161.
184. Id. at 1161-62.
185. Id. at 1162.
186. 560 F.2d at 366-67.
187. Id. at 368. The district court had reported that the university, after conducting hear-
ings, decided no violations occurred. 422 F. Supp. at 1159. The university actually found
mitigating circumstances, and that was why the school ignored the directive of the NCAA.
560 F.2d at 359.
188. 560 F.2d at 368.
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of the potential economic interest at stake was Hall v. University of
Minnesota.'89 In Hall, the plaintiff twice was not accepted into his
chosen field of study, a separate school within the university that re-
quired students to apply for admission.19° As a result, Hall became
ineligible to play basketball."'
The court issued an injunction, compelling Hall's admission to the
program. 92 The court gave three reasons for the decision: (1) the plain-
tiff had been recruited as a basketball player, not a scholar, and he
lived up to those expectations;' 93 (2) he had a good chance of being
a second round choice in the National Basketball Association player
draft if he played basketball during his senior year,' 94 but his chances
of realizing a professional career would be impaired if he were denied
the opportunity to play;' 9 and (3) he had decided to use his college
career as a means of entry into the professional leagues, not as a
means to a college degree,'96 and therefore he would suffer a substantial
loss if he could not play.'
97
The rationale behind Hall, that the potential economic reward to
an athlete with the chance of securing a professional contract outweighs
the enforcement of eligibility rules, at first seems persuasive. This
reasoning, however, does not withstand close examination. Implicit
in the decision is the notion that if the plaintiff had no realistic aspira-
tions of reaching the professional ranks, then relief would not be
granted. 9 This violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. 99
The fourteenth amendment provides that no state shall deny to any
person the equal protection of the law."' This clause, accordingly,
guarantees that similarly situated individuals will be treated in a similar
manner by a government entity.2"' This principle is violated if a few
suspended athletes can have their eligibility restored while others can-
189. 530 F. Supp. 104 (D. Minn. 1982).
190. Id. at 105.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 110-11.
193. Id. at 106.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. This apparently is not uncommon. For instance, only 57% of all Division I college
football players graduate, and only 10% of all players in the National Football League are
college graduates. Chicago Sun-Times, Nov. 25, 1983, at 137, col. 1.
197. 530 F. Supp. at 108.
198. See id. at 106, 108.
199. See infra notes 200-05 and accompanying text.
200. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, §1.
201. J. Now x, R. ROTUNDA AND J. YoUNG, supra note 31, at 587.
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not, merely because the former have brighter professional prospects." 2
The equal protection clause violation is demonstrated in the case
of Jones v. National Collegiate Athletic Association."3 In Jones, the
plaintiff-hockey player petitioned the court to restore his collegiate
eligibility even though he had been paid to play hockey for two
previous years.20" The court declined, saying that any athlete would
be ineligible if he violated the challenged rules, and hence a decision
to restore the plaintiff's eligibility would place him in a superior, not
merely an equal, position in comparison to other student athletes.2"'
This rationale applies with equal force to the situation in Hall.
No clear precedent seems to exist for the recognition of a property
right in college athletic participation. As discussed previously, the dic-
tum of Behagen was applied in Regents of the University of Min-
nesota, a case whose value as precedent was left in doubt after a
reversal on other grounds at the appellate level. Hall, meanwhile, ap-
parently would authorize relief when the athlete can demonstrate a
real opportunity for a professional career, while denying relief to the
athlete suspended for the same violation who had no realistic profes-
sional chances. Those who challenge NCAA procedures as being
violative of due process also have attempted to compare student athletes
with students in professional programs. This comparison, however,
is equally unpersuasive.
C. Comparisons with Professional Students
Advocates for athletes' property rights have suggested that the col-
lege athlete is comparable to a law student or medical student who
is pursuing a chosen occupation. 206 Under this view, the right to pur-
sue a professional sports contract deserves protection because the
similar right to pursue a profession, such as law or medicine, cannot
be denied without due process.20 7 This argument, which apparently
has not been tested in court, is not persuasive because college athletes
and students in professional programs are not similarly situated.
The comparison between students in professional programs and stu-
dent athletes has three flaws. First, a person cannot become an at-
202. See infra notes 203-05 and accompanying text.
203. 392 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1975).
204. Id. at 296-97.
205. Id. at 301.
206. See Comment, supra note 18, at 503-04.
207. Id.; see also North v. West Virginia Bd. of Regents, 233 S.E.2d 411, 415 (W. Va.
1977) (due process required for expulsion from professional school because "the higher the
level of achievement, the greater the loss on removal").
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torney or a physician without studying law or medicine, respectively.I 8
An athlete, however, need not pursue a course of study at college
or participate in collegiate athletics to play professional sports.20 9 Se-
cond, when a law or medical student is suspended, he is excluded
from the entire educational process, a total denial of benefit that re-
quires procedural due process under Goss. A suspended athlete is not
similarly deprived of all educational benefits."' 0 Third, the primary
purpose of law and medical schools is to produce competent
professionals."' The primary purpose of universities and colleges,
however, is not to produce professional athletes."'
The premise of the argument that students in professional programs
and student athletes are similarly situated also is incorrect because
all athletes, unlike law students and medical students, cannot pursue
a profession. Intercollegiate competition is the pinnacle of athletic
participation for most women athletes because few opportunities in
208. See 233 S.E.2d at 417 (student expelled from professional school must continue his
academic career at another institution). In California, a person may become an attorney after
studying law under the personal supervision of a judge or attorney. See RULEs REGULATING
A ,?nSSION TO PRACTICE LAW IN CALIFORNIA 22 (1982). The prospective attorney must devote
at least 18 hours each week for at least 48 weeks each year to the study of law and must
take a written examination each month. Id. Four years of study are required before the pro-
spective attorney qualifies to take the bar examination. Id. at 18. Even under this approach,
therefore, a person cannot become a lawyer without devoting substantial time and effort to
the study of law. In contrast, no comparable restrictions are placed on student athletes who
aspire to professional careers. See infra note 209 and accompanying text.
209. Darryl Dawkins, of the New Jersey Nets, and Moses Malone, of the Philadelphia
Seventy-sixers, are two professional basketball players who never attended college. Who's Who
in Pro Basketball, SPORT WORLD, April, 1984, at 42, 53.
210. Since the NCAA does not require a member institution to cancel financial aid awarded
to a student athlete who violated an eligibility rule, that student may still attend school. See
NCAA CoNsT. art. 3, § 4(c)(2), reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 12, at 19. Of course,
the university may decide to cancel aid, but it is not required to do so. Id.
211. See Comment, supra note 123, at 344 (purpose of an institution of higher learning
is to train the mind).
212. The fallacy in this argument is evident from the comments of John Mengelt, a former
professional basketball player. He said:
The primary function of any educational institution is to educate its constituency.
Other ancillary functions such as ... intercollegiate athletic programs are important
but should always take a back seat to education. The scholar may not be able to
find a job in his chosen field, but he should, indeed, be able to find a job because
of his overall education. The athlete is no different. He must focus on his overall
collegiate experience and not that one-in-a-million shot at professional sports.
Wilmette (Ill.) News Advertiser, Dec. 1, 1983, at 19, col. 3. Kevin Ross, a former basketball
player for Creighton University, was one student athlete who gambled and lost on a profes-
sional career. Ross said he gave 150% to basketball and received only 50% of an education.
Ross played basketball at Creighton for four years, averaging 4.2 points per game. Academically,
he completed 96 of 128 credits needed for graduation and compiled a D average. Many of
Ross' passing grades were in "comfort courses," like theory of basketball and squad participa-
tion. Omaha World-Herald, June 18, 1983, at 21, col. 1, continued on 25, col. 1. Ross recently
graduated from Westside Preparatory School in Chicago, however, where he enrolled to learn
how to read. See Chicago Sun-Times, May 31, 1983, at 31, col. 1.
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professional sports are available to women at this time. 2 3 In addi-
tion, even some male athletes, such as those who participate in swim-
ming, track, and gymnastics, have only limited professional sports
opportunities.
As discussed above, comparisons between students in professional
programs and college athletes do not support the athletes' claim of
entitlement to athletic participation. Students in professional programs
and college athletes are not similarly situated in terms of educational
requirements or career opportunities. California case law also does
not support college athletes' claims of entitlement to athletic
competition.2" ' Two California courts have found collegiate athletic
participation to be a substantial interest, but the courts did not ad-
dress the due process contentions of student athletes in either case.2 '
As a result, California cases do not establish a property interest in
athletic participation.
D. California Case Law
Two California courts have found that participation in college
athletics is a substantial interest worthy of protection. In Cabrillo Com-
munity College District v. California Junior College Association,"6
the plaintiff college district brought suit to enjoin the application of
a rule prohibiting athletes from competing in intercollegiate athletics
until they satisfied a residency requirement.2"7 The appellate court did
not decide whether athletes have a property right in participation, 2 8
holding instead that sections 25503 and 25505.7 of the Education Code
prohibit community colleges from using residency requirements as a
basis for denying admission to high school graduates.2 9 The Junior
College association, as an agent of the community colleges, could not
impose a residency requirement because the member colleges had no
power to set residency rules.22
Another case in which a California court found athletics to be wor-
thy of protection is California State University, Hayward v. National
Collegiate Athletic Association.22" ' In that case, the university sought
213. Women can make a decent living in only three sports-golf, tennis, and bowling.
Sacramento Bee, Dec. 18, 1983, at I1, col. 1.
214. See infra notes 216-29 and accompanying text.
215. Id.
216. 44 Cal. App. 3d 367, 118 Cal. Rptr. 708 (1975).
217. Id. at 369-70, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 709-10.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 371, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 710-11.
220. Id. at 372, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 711.
221. 47 Cal. App. 3d 533, 121 Cal. Rptr. 85 (1975).
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to enjoin the NCAA from enforcing an indefinite probation against
the entire athletic program2 22 on the ground that the probation violated
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 2 3 The NCAA
had ordered the university to declare two freshmen ineligible for
academic violations.224 When the university refused to comply, the
NCAA imposed the probation.
2 5
The appellate court granted the injunction, holding that the university
had a substantial interest in terminating the probation. 226 The court
noted that the sanctions that had been imposed would impair the ability
of the university to recruit, 22 and ineligibility for postseason tour-
naments would lead to a loss in revenue. 22 This analysis, which ap-
plies to the interest of the university, and not the interests of the
student athletes, undoubtedly is correct. The economic benefit accru-
ing to the university is real and immediate, while the benefit to the
student athletes is only speculative.
229
Neither California case is sound precedent for the proposition that
college athletes have a property right in participation. Cabrillo did
not reach the constitutional issue of whether athletic participation is
a property right. California State University, Hayward stressed the
interest of the university in athletic participation.
The due process protection given to athletics is tenuous at best.
Courts that have granted relief to athletes have held that athletics
were related integrally to the educational process or that the poten-
tial economic benefit outweighed the enforcement of eligibility rules.
The courts that found athletics to be related integrally to the educa-
tional process did so because a clearly defined constitutional issue
justified the result.23° When courts have held participation to be a
protected property right because of potential economic benefit, they
apparently relied on dictum or implicitly approved unequal treatment
of athletes. The language in Roth, stating that the nature of the in-
222. Id. at 537, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 87.
223. Id. at 540, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 89.
224. Id. at 539, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 88.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 541, 121 Cal. Rptr. 90.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 544, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 91.
229. See Note, The National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n: Fundamental Fairness and the En-
forcement Program, 23 Aaiz. L. REv. 1065, 1091-92 (1981) (loss of revenue from penalties
imposed by the NCAA can harm the entire athletic program of the university); McDonald
v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 370 F. Supp. 625, 632 n.10 (1974). In McDonald, the
court said "[t]he players' share of the intangible assets is-at best-a fleeting instant in the
history of athletics. How many can remember the players in 7 out of the last 9 NCAA national
championship basketball tournaments? But, no one can really forget U.C.L.A." Id.
230. See supra notes 33-68 and accompanying text.
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terest is controlling, was ignored by the courts.23" ' Moreover, the com-
parisons between students in professional programs and college athletes
inherently are inadequate because the two groups are not similarly
situated.232 Finally, the California cases did not confront the due pro-
cess issues raised by student athletes, and thus these cases do not
establish a property right in athletic participation. 2" Since college
athletes have no tangible interest in athletic participation then the
athletes also are not deprived of liberty if their reputations are harmed
because sanctions are imposed upon them for violating NCAA eligibili-
ty rules.
LIBERTY INTEREST
The United States Supreme Court clarified the scope of the pro-
tected liberty right in Paul v. Davis."' In Paul, the Louisville Police
Department circulated photographs of "active shoplifters.'23 Davis'
picture was included, but in fact, he had never been convicted of
shoplifting at the time the photos were circulated.23 6 Charges against
him later were dismissed.237 Davis argued that circulation of the
photographs deprived him of a protected liberty interest without due
process because the damage to his reputation seriously impaired his
future employment opportunities.238
In reversing the appellate court and reinstating the decision of the
district court, the United States Supreme Court held that mere stigma,
apart from a tangible interest such as employment, is not a depriva-
tion of liberty that requires procedural due process safeguards.23 9 The
Court noted that this holding was consistent with the Goss decision. 240
Goss held that suspended students had been deprived of a liberty in-
terest because the withdrawal of the entitlement to education, created
by Ohio law, could impact adversely on the students' reputations. 24'
The Paul rationale was applied to college athletes in Colorado
Seminary v. National Collegiate Athletic Association.242 In that case,
231. See supra notes 169-205 and accompanying text.
232. See supra notes 206-13 and accompanying text.
233. See supra notes 214-29 and accompanying text.
234. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
235. Id. at 695.
236. Id. at 695-96.
237. Id. at 696.
238. Id. at 697.
239. Id. at 701.
240. Id. at 710.
241. Id.
242. 417 F. Supp. 885 (D. Colo. 1976), aff'd, 570 F.2d 320 (1978) (per curiam).
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the plaintiffs argued that NCAA sanctions harmed their reputations
and impaired their ability to realize professional careers. 4 3 As a result,
the plaintiffs claimed they had been deprived of a liberty interest
without due process. 44
In Colorado Seminary, the court first held that no constitutionally
protected property interest exists in collegiate athletic participation. "45
Because no other tangible, constitutional interest was denied, the court,
citing Paul, held that the athletes were not deprived of liberty merely
because the NCAA sanctions may have harmed their reputations. 4 6
Because sanctions imposed for violations of NCAA eligibility rules
did not deprive the athletes in Colorado Seminary of a tangible in-
terest, complaints by college athletes that NCAA sanctions deprived
them of liberty, therefore, do not merit constitutional protection.
CONCLUSION
College athletes who violate eligibility rules increasingly have sought
judicial relief, claiming that NCAA sanctions deprive them of a prop-
erty or liberty interest without procedural due process. The athletes
are attracted by the lucrative salaries paid to professional athletes,
and the collegians fear that NCAA sanctions will harm their chances
of realizing professional sports careers. This comment has
demonstrated, however, that college athletes have no property or liberty
interests in intercollegiate competition that require procedural due pro-
cess before sanctions are imposed by the NCAA.
This comment has demonstrated that NCAA disciplinary measures
constitute state action because the authority of the NCAA over col-
lege athletics is substantial and pervasive. Since the threshold require-
ment of state action is met, courts must decide whether athletic par-
ticipation is protected constitutionally. Roth held that property rights
243. See 417 F. Supp. at 895.
244. See id. Theoretically, stigma from sanctions imposed by the NCAA may be detrimen-
tal to a student athlete's professional hopes. Practically, however, if the athlete is talented
enough then sanctions are not an impediment. For instance, in 1982, Quintin Dailey, an All-
American basketball player at the University of San Francisco, pleaded guilty to assaulting a
student nurse. In exchange for the guilty plea, the authorities dropped three other charges,
one of which was attempted rape. Dailey was selected by the Chicago Bulls in the first round
of the National Basketball Association player draft, and he became an instant millionaire.
Sacramento Bee, Dec. 25, 1983, at Cl, col. 1.
245. 417 F. Supp. at 895; see supra notes 110-14 and accompanying text.
246. 417 F. Supp. at 896. The district court noted that precedent in the 10th Circuit in-
dicated that suspension from athletic participation was not a deprivation of liberty. See id.
The court also observed that under a Paul analysis, the plaintiff-university was not deprived
of liberty either. Id. Of course, the plaintiffs in Colorado Seminary may have a cause of action
for defamation. See 424 U.S. at 712.
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are created and defined by independent sources, such as state law.
The subsequent decision of Goss interpreted Roth as protecting the
educational process when an entitlement exists. Those courts that have
declined to recognize a property right in participation have held either
that Goss protects the entire educational process and not the separate
parts, or that Goss was concerned with total exclusion from the educa-
tional process. These courts have continued to rely on pre-Goss
precedents involving high school players. An analysis under Bishop,
a case in which the United States Supreme Court applied the Roth
entitlement theory while denying a claim for continued employment,
further indicates that no right to athletic participation exists. Bishop's
claim for employment is similar to the student athletes' claim for
participation.
This comment has established that court decisions supporting pro-
tection for athletics are of limited authority as precedent and that
other arguments offered by advocates for athletes' property rights are
unpersuasive. Moreover, since no tangible interest is denied, college
athletes suspended from athletic participation are not deprived of liberty
under a Paul analysis. The determination that college athletes have
no property or liberty interests in intercollegiate competition is con-
sistent with the policy of the NCAA in maintaining a clear separa-
tion between amateur and professional sports. This determination fur-
ther ensures that college athletics will not move toward becoming a
minor league for professional athletics but instead will remain closely
related to academia.
Keith Randall Solar
1230
